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The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which the
legal principles associated with the regime of the high seas apply to the
seabed beyond the limits of coastal state jurisdiction. In this regard,
its object is to clarify, and thereby perhaps narrow, the scope of the
current dispute concerning the nature of the regime applicable to that
area of the seabed. Resolution of the apparent issues in dispute by a
process of deductive reasoning from a disputed assumption regarding
the status of the seabed areas in question is not the goal of this paper.
The public debate on the issue of the relationship between the high
seas regime and the seabed beyond the limits of coastal state jurisdic-
tion divides those who believe that the status of that seabed area is
high seas from those who say it is not. Both groups largely end the
legal inquiry there. The former group asserts that all uses of the sea-
bed and subsoil are governed by jurisdictional rules derived directly or
by analogy from existing high seas law. The latter group asserts that
the seabed beyond the limits of coastal state jurisdiction is not gov-
erned by those rules at all.I
If one wishes to present an accurate picture of the state of the law
at this stage, one cannot avoid the ambiguous details. The reality is
that there is no consensus among states at this time on the underlying
conceptual issue of the status of seabed areas beyond coastal state ju-
risdiction. It may be that one side is, or will turn out to be, correct.
That we cannot know with certainty today. The areas of consensus
and dispute, however, are more sharply defined than the debate might
suggest. Examining them in some detail may help us ascertain where
we are and what needs to be done.
This article is set out in three parts. The first section briefly de-
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author served as United States
Representative and Vice-Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, and as Chairman of the English Language Group of the Conference Drafting
Committee. The views expressed herein are his own. The ideas set forth in this article were first
presented for discussion at the Twenty-First Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute.
i. This debate is not unlike the debate regarding the status of the exclusive economic zone.
See infra note 16.
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scribes the geograghic scope of the sea. The second section analyzes
the geographic scope of the high seas. The last section presents six
agreed legal principles relevant to the seabed debate which - contrary
to the tone of much of the debate - constitute a substantial and grow-
ing consensus on the elements of the legal regime of the seabed beyond
coastal state jurisdiction. The article concludes by suggesting that
more is agreed in this area than is often acknowledged, and that the
broader debate would be aided by recognition of this.
II. GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE SEA
If one asks whether the seabed and subsoil are part of the sea for
purposes of applying the law of the sea, there can be no doubt that the
answer is "yes." The 1958 Conventions on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone,2 the High Seas, 3 and the Continental Shelf4 deal
with the seabed and subsoil. Many provisions of the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea also deal with the seabed and
subsoil.'
This seemingly obvious point has potential legal implications. The
sea, including the seabed and subsoil, are subject to a special system of
law that incorporates some, but not all, of the rules applicable on land.
Perhaps the most important difference is that the rule that sovereignty
may be acquired by effective occupation is a stranger to the modem
law of the sea. Internal waters may be established by coastal states
within geographic limits determined by the international law of the sea
without reference to effective occupation. 6 No other states may claim
jurisdiction there. Also, every coastal state is entitled to a territorial
sea, continental shelf, and now an exclusive economic zone, whose
maximum limits are determined by the international law of the sea
without reference to effective occupation. 7 No other states may claim
2. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 2,
14(3), 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1608, No. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, at 3, 5, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 208, 214.
3. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 2, 24-29, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, 2319-
2320, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, at 3, 8-9, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 96-98.
4. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
5. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Sales
No. E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
6. The question of historic bays is properly regarded as a question of acquisition of title by
prescription rather than acquisition of title over terra nullius by effective occupation. The re-
quirements for prescriptive title are more exacting, particularly with regard to acquiescence by
other states. Moreover, the doctrine of historic bays is applied only in limited coastal areas
largely enclosed by land.
7. Article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 4, and Article 77 of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 5, expressly provide that the rights of the
coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional. Arti-
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jurisdiction there either. No claims of sovereignty or territorial juris-
diction are permitted beyond the limits of coastal state jurisdiction es-
tablished by international law.8
The received regime of the seabed beyond coastal state jurisdiction,
then, is not a complete tabula rasa. An attempt to extend "first come,
first served" rules of pre-emptive occupation to large chunks of the
seabed is inconsistent with the nature of the modern law of the sea.9
In itself, this does not mean the seabed and subsoil and their resources
cannot be used, but it may mean that pre-emptive claims based on
effective occupation need not be respected.
III. GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE HIGH SEAS
High seas law is now extensively codified in a variety of interna-
tional agreements. This portion of the article analyzes the treatment
of the geographic scope of the high seas in some of the more important
documents, particularly the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and
the 1982 Convention on the Law of:the Sea.
A. The Convention on the High Seas
Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas states: "The
term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State."' 0 With respect to
the freedom of the high seas, Article 2 of that Convention states in
part: "It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) Freedom to lay
submarine cables and pipelines; (4). Freedom to fly over the high
seas." I I
Article 24 of the High Seas Convention addresses the prevention of
pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil "from ships or pipelines or
resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its
cle 241 of the U.N. Convention elaborates on the more general theme by providing that marine
scientific research shall not constitute the legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine
environment or its resources.
8. Convention on the High Seas, art 2, supra note 3; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
arts. 87, 89, 137, supra note 5; Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration of
Principles].
9. Invoking the S.S. Lotus case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 10, on the issue of pre-emptive
claims misses the point. There is ample evidence that claims of sovereignty or exclusive jurisdic-
tion based on effective occupation are prohibited by the law of the sea as a whole, whatever the
nature of the specific regime that applies. Id.
10. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, at art. 1.
11. Id. at art. 2.
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subsoil." Article 25 addresses the prevention of pollution of the seas
"from the dumping of radioactive waste."
Articles 26 to 29 of the High Seas Convention contain more de-
tailed rules regarding submarine cables and pipelines, including the
duty of the coastal state not to impede the laying or maintenance of
such cables or pipelines on its continental shelf. Articles 27 and 28
deal with responsibility for the breaking or injury "of a submarine
cable beneath the high seas."
The foregoing texts do not necessarily clarify the broad question of
whether the seabed and subsoil are part of the high seas. The refer-
ences to the "freedom to fly over the high seas" and to "a submarine
cable beneath the high seas" may be used to support either conclusion,
and may or may not be relevant. 12 If the seabed and subsoil are part
of the sea for purposes of the law of the sea, and if the high seas em-
braces "all parts of the sea" beyond specified coastal limits, then it
would seem to follow that the seabed and subsoil beyond those coastal
limits are part of the high seas. But even the 1958 Conventions are not
that simple.
The precise question is which rules of the law of the sea apply.
The text makes it clear that, to the extent one regards the Convention
on the High Seas as embodying the regime of the high seas at the time,
that regime expressly regulates at least some uses of the seabed. These
include not only submarine cables and pipelines, dumping, and pollu-
tion resulting from exploitation and exploration of the seabed and sub-
soil, but other activities traditionally associated with the freedoms of
the high seas such as anchoring.
The simultaneous drafting and adoption of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf makes it clear, however, that not all uses of the sea-
bed of the high seas are subject to all rules of high seas law under the
1958 Conventions. The exploration and exploitation of the natural re-
sources of the continental shelf are not freedoms of the high seas; on
the contrary, they are subject to the exclusive sovereign rights of the
coastal state. At the same time, the High Seas Convention itself elabo-
rates certain obligations of the coastal state with respect to the exercise
of those very sovereign rights, notably with respect to pollution and
submarine cables and pipelines. The end result is that all states enjoy
only some freedoms of the high seas on the seabed of the continental
shelf, and that the coastal state enjoys exclusive rights with respect to
the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the conti-
12. Article 87 of the U.N. Convention, supra note 5, substitutes the term "freedom of over-
flight" for the term "freedom to fly over the high seas." This would suggest that little if any
significance should be attached to the clause "over the high seas" today.
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nental shelf, subject to certain obligations derived from the high seas
regime. A categorical statement that the continental shelf is, or is not,
high seas would not even begin to describe that result with any
accuracy.
This analysis of the application of high seas law to the continental
shelf suggests only a partial resolution of the issue of the applicability
of the high seas regime to the seabed beyond the continental shelf. It
is clear that to some extent the high seas regime (including certain
freedoms of the high seas) does apply to the seabed of the high seas.
Beyond that, it depends on one's point of view. The exclusive rights of
the coastal state over continental shelf resources are regarded by some
as an exception to the general principle that all uses of the seabed and
subsoil of the high seas are subject to the high seas regime. Alterna-
tively, the existence of those coastal state rights is regarded by others
as evidence of a principle that, at least in so far as natural resources
are concerned, high seas freedoms do not apply to the seabed and
subsoil.
The travaux prdparatoires of the 1958 Conventions shed little light
on the issue of the application of the high seas regime to seabed re-
sources beyond the continental shelf. In its commentary on the text
that became Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, the Inter-
national Law Commission stated:
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not re-
strictive. . . . The Commission has not made specific mention of the
freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered
that apart from the case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil or
subsoil of a continental shelf - a case dealt with separately... below -
such exploitation had not yet assumed sufficient practical importance to
justify special regulation. 13
Some read this statement to mean that the freedom to explore and
exploit the seabed and subsoil beyond the continental shelf exists but is
not specially regulated. Others read it to mean that the High Seas
Convention does not apply to such exploration and exploitation at all.
B. The Declaration of Principles
The preamble of the Declaration of Principles regarding the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, adopted by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in preparation for the Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, contains the following preambular clause:
Recognizing that the existing legal regime of the high seas does not pro-
13. Report of the International Law Commission, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 9) at 24, U.N.
Doc. A/3159 (1956).
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vide substantive rules for regulating the exploration of the aforesaid area
and the exploitation of its resources .... 14
This clause has been interpreted by proponents of the alternative
positions in the same manner as the commentary of the International
Law Commission. It should nevertheless be noted that both this
clause and the Commission's commentary deal only with resources,
while both the High Seas Convention and the Declaration of Princi-
ples address matters going beyond the use of resources. At the least
this suggests that there were no serious differences regarding the appli-
cation of high seas law to non-resource uses.
C. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Most of Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea is identical to the Convention on the High Seas. The most
significant change for purposes of this analysis is that the U.N. Con-
vention contains a separate Part XI dealing with the seabed beyond
the limits of coastal state jurisdiction. Prior to examining the impact
of Part XI, however, it is useful to examine Part VII to determine if
the few changes made in the articles dealing with the high seas con-
firm, or alter, the conclusions we might draw from the text of the Con-
vention on the High Seas.
Unlike the High Seas Convention, Part VII of the 1982 Conven-
tion does not define the high seas. Article 86 states in pertinent part:
"The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipe-
lagic State."15
This change was the result of lengthy negotiations regarding the
question of the application of the high seas regime to the exclusive
economic zone.16 It suggests that the relevant question is application
of the rules of high seas law, rather than the status of the area. This is
made clear, for example, in Part V of the Convention regarding the
exclusive economic zone. Part V incorporates virtually all of the non-
14. Declaration of Principles, supra note 8.
15. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 86.
16. The author has previously expressed his views on this matter elsewhere. Oxman, An
Analysis of the Exclusive Economic Zone as Formulated in the Informal Composite Negotiating
Text, in LAW OF THE SEA: STATE PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION 57, 77-78 (T.
Clingan ed. 1982) (Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, Thirteenth Annual Conference);
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Ses-
sion, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 67-75. "[T]he question whether relevant aspects of the economic
zone regime are part of the high seas regime has been resolved by making relevant aspects of the
high seas regime part of the economic zone regime and by deleting the geographic definition of
the high seas." Id. at 74.
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resource provisions of Part VII into the economic zone regime "in so
far as they are not incompatible with this Part." However, pursuant
to Articles 56 and 58 of the 1982 Convention, not all of the freedoms
of the high seas continue to apply to the exclusive economic zone;
freedom of fishing, for example, yields to coastal state sovereign rights
over living resources.
Another important change with respect to high seas freedoms is
made in Article 87 of the 1982 Convention. It preserves the words
inter alia from Article 2 of the High Seas Convention, making clear
that the enumeration of certain high seas freedoms is not exhaustive.
At the same time, it expands and qualifies the list of enumerated free-
doms as follows:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; 17
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permit-
ted under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 2; 18
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.19
For purposes of this study, two of the changes in article 87 are
significant. First, the enumerated freedoms include at least one other
freedom that normally entails use of the seabed and subsoil, namely
the construction of artificial islands and installations. Second, while
the exercise of certain high seas freedoms on the seabed is expressly
qualified by cross-references to Part VI (continental shelf), there are
no qualifying cross-references to Part XI (seabed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction).20
D. Conclusions Regarding Geographic Scope of the High Seas
The foregoing analysis clearly suggests that there is no serious dis-
pute regarding the application of high seas law to at least some uses of
the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of coastal state jurisdiction.
Among these would be the freedom to anchor, to lay submarine
17. Part VI of the U.N. Convention, supra note 5, deals with the continental shelf.
18. Part VII, Section 2 of the U.N. Convention, supra note 5, deals with conservation and
management of the living resources of the high seas.
19. Part XIII of the U.N. Convention, supra note 5, deals with marine scientific research.
20. The author does not suggest that too much be made of the second point. It does not
mean that Article 87 should be read in isolation from Part XI. It does suggest, however, that
Part XI was not regarded as contradicting the application of high seas law to at least some uses
of the seabed in principle. The author has reported elsewhere on the difficulties encountered by
the Drafting Committee of the Conference in harmonizing texts emerging from different main
committees of the Conference. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The Tenth Session, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 17-19 (1982).
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cables and pipelines, to construct artificial islands and other installa-
tions, and to conduct marine scientific research. Needless to say, these
freedoms must be exercised with due regard to other uses.
It is at this point that this conclusion must be tested against the
positions taken by states with specific reference to the seabed beyond
the limits of coastal state jurisdiction.
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Prohibition on Claims
The fundamental principle of high seas law regarding national
claims is stated in Article 2 of the High Seas Convention: "The high
seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. ' 21 Articles 87 and 89 of the 1982
Convention repeat this principle.
The U.N. General Assembly's Declaration of Principles regarding
the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction states: "The area
shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States or per-
sons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sover-
eignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof."' 22 Article 137 of the
1982 Convention states with respect to the same area: "No State shall
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the
Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty
or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized." 23
The United States Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, as-
serting "high seas freedom to engage in exploration for, and commer-
cial recovery of, hard mineral resources of the deep seabed," expressly
affirms that by enactment of the Act the United States "does not
thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdic-
tion over, or ownership of, any areas or resources in the deep
seabed." 24
From these texts we can articulate an important but not explicit
commonality, one subject to erosion, and fragile if not identified and
preserved. 25 Even those who reject the broad principle that the seabed
has the status of high seas in fact accept one of its most important
21. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, at art. 2.
22. Declaration of Principles, supra note 8.
23. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, at art. 137.
24. 30 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982).
25. It is important to bear in mind that none of these texts prohibit use, including exploration
and exploitation of resources. The question of the appropriate rules governing different uses is
another matter.
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implications, namely the prohibition on national claims. Those who
reject the broad principle that all states are bound by Part XI of the
1982 Convention as customary international law nonetheless accept
the prohibition on claims if only by virtue of their position that the
area has the status of high seas.
This point of agreement is not as obvious as it seems, and may in
fact erode unless the existence of such agreement is emphasized. A
number of commentators have on occasion confused the position that
the area is high seas with the position that no law, or at least no tradi-
tional law, applies. If the area is high seas, no part of it may be sub-
jected to national claims. If no law applies, then those who reject Part
XI of the Convention may contend that states are theoretically free to
make pre-.emptive claims on the grounds that such claims are not pro-
hibited by international law. 26
In this regard, it is important to recognize what is, and is not, in
dispute with respect to the legislation and agreements of the United
States and certain other states with respect to deep seabed mining.
The United States statute prohibits the issuance of authorizations to
mine by the United States if the area proposed is already subject to a
previous authorization issued by a reciprocating state.27 The Provi-
sional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining agreed by sev-
eral Western states in essence implements this reciprocating state
system. 28 In the words of the statute, the United States thereby "exer-
cises its jurisdiction over United States citizens and vessels, and for-
eign persons and vessels otherwise subject to its jurisdiction. ' ' 29 The
reciprocating states are doing the same. No pre-emptive claim is made
as against the world; what is asserted is a universal right to mine and a
right of each state to prevent its nationals from mining.
Some may wish to argue that the universal right to mine may be
exercised only in conformity with the provisions of the 1982 Conven-
tion. They may also wish to argue that while no pre-emptive claims
are asserted as against the world, the legislation and agreements may
create a political situation in which any global agreement would have
to respect the essence of existing authorizations as a condition of ac-
ceptance. 30 Be that as it may, there is no basis at present for asserting
26. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
27. 30 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982).
28. Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining, Aug. 3, 1984, 23 I.L.M.
1354 (1984).
29. 30 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982).
30. Resolution II appended to the Final Act of the Conference deals with the protection of
preparatory investment in pioneer activities. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, at 158, 177-82.
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that any state is violating the "no-claims" principle in letter or in
spirit.
It is in the interests of all states to emphasize the universal agree-
ment on this point, if only to prevent far-fetched interpretations of the
due regard principle. While high seas law does not permit a pre-emp-
tive claim as against non-consenting states of an exclusive right to
mine a site measuring thousands of square miles for several decades,
all states are required to have have due regard to the exercise of the
rights and freedoms of other states, including deep seabed mining.
Apart from the question of the lawfulness of the mining, there is no
doubt that unreasonable physical interference with a mining ship or
installation would be prohibited.
Some have sought to go further, however, and convert the vener-
able "reasonable regard" or "due regard" principle3' into the func-
tional equivalent of a pre-emptive claim. They argue that mining in an
area already staked out by someone else violates the "due regard" obli-
gation. There is no precedent for such extended application of the
principle with respect to fisheries or even nuclear tests. It is contra-
dicted by the limited and unobjectionable safety zone provisions of the
Continental Shelf Convention 32 and the 1982 Convention, 33 which
deal with installations that may be used to exploit resources located
well beyond the safety zones. The very states that advocates of such a
position seek to benefit would presumably shudder at the notion of
such a broad extension of the -reasonable regard principle with respect
to the waters of the high seas or the exclusive economic zone, or even
non-resource uses of the seabed.
The key point is that the "reasonable regard" or "due regard"
principle must be read in conjunction with the "no claims" and uni-
versal use principles. Accordingly, whatever the position of states re-
garding the appropriate system for mining the deep seabeds, it is not in
their interests to loosen the restraints of the "no claims" principle on
those who take a different view of the regulation of mining. Both the
high seas and the Part XI advocates must be encouraged to live with
the restraints as well as the benefits of their position.
31. High Seas Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2; U.N. Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 87,
147.
32. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 4, at art. 5.
33. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 60, 80, 147, 260. Article 147 combines the rules
on safety zones in paragraph 2 with its enunciation of the "reasonable regard" principle in
paragraphs I and 3.
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B. The Universal Use Principle
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention states that the high seas are
open to all nations. It goes on to state that freedom of the high seas
"is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by
the other rules of international law." Article 87 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea provides, "The high seas are open
to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas
is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by
other rules of international law."
The Declaration of Principles Regarding the Seabed Beyond Na-
tional Jurisdiction states, "the area shall be open to use exclusively for
peaceful purposes by all States, whether coastal or land-locked, with-
out discrimination, in accordance with the international regime to be
established." With respect to the same area, article 141 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides, "The Area shall
be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all States, whether
coastal or land-locked, without discrimination and without prejudice
to the other provisions of this Part."
Part XI of the 1982 Convention contains substantial restrictions on
use of the seabed beyond coastal state jurisdiction, but these relate
only to "activities in the Area." The term "activities in the Area" is
defined by Article 1 to mean "all activities of exploration for, and ex-
ploitation of, the resources of the Area." Article 133 defines "re-
sources" to mean "all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ
in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules."
Accordingly, the effect of Part XI with respect to activities other
than exploration and exploitation of mineral resources is the same as
the effect of the high seas regime. The area is open to use by all states.
Moreover, nothing in the specific provisions of Part XI regarding ex-
ploration and exploitation of mineral resources contradicts the univer-
sal use principle. The Convention expressly contemplates access by
all, with discrimination prohibited.34 Article 150 (g) indeed goes be-
yond this to encourage "the enhancement of opportunities for all
States Parties, irrespective of their social and economic systems or geo-
graphical location, to participate in the development of the resources
of the Area."
The idea that universal use of an area is subject to generally agreed
regulation is no stranger to the high seas regime. Article 10 of the
High Seas Convention requires states to conform to generally accepted
34. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, at arts. 141, 151(i)(c), 152(!), 153; ann. III, arts. 6(3),
6(5), 7(2), 7(5); ann. IV, arts. 12(3), 12(5).
[Vol. 10:526
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international standards regarding safety measures and labor condi-
tions. Article 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea elaborates on this duty at great length. The same idea forms the
cornerstone of Part XII of the 1982 Convention regarding protection
of the marine environment. 35
The example of high seas fisheries is particularly instructive in this
regard. The right to fish on the high seas is expressly subject to con-
servation rules, including the duty to cooperate with other states in the
adoption of conservation measures. 36 Accordingly, the principle of in-
ternational regulation of the exploration and exploitation of seabed re-
sources is not unique to Part XI of the 1982 Convention, but emerges
from high seas law as well.
Questions of course remain regarding the scope of participation in
regulation. Regulation of high seas fishing is generally entrusted to
user states, although the basic duties are set forth in global conven-
tions on the law of the sea. Environmental protection at sea is fre-
quently addressed on a global basis, as evidenced not only by Part XII
of the 1982 Convention and various environmental treaties, but by the
establishment of the U.N. Environment Programme and the expanded
composition of the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the
International Maritime Organisation as compared with its Maritime
Safety Committee. At the same time, regional regulation is also
extensive.
Under high seas law, an exclusive right to mine a large area for an
extended period can be established only with the consent of other
states. As U.S. law and the negotiations among the Western states
participating in mining arrangements with each other clearly reveal,
that consent is necessarily conditioned on agreed understandings re-
garding the size of mine sites, the duration of the rights, the means of
acquiring priority, and associated environmental and other condi-
tions.37 An examination of those conditions will reveal striking simi-
larities among national laws on deep seabed mining, the Provisional
Understanding reached among Western states, and Annex III of the
1982 Convention.
It of course comes as no surprise to discover that the essence of the
problem regarding Part XI of the 1982 Convention concerns the ob-
35. See id. at arts. 213-219.
36. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, arts. 1, 4, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.M.T.S. 285; U.N. Convention, supra
note 5, at arts. 116-119.
37. See 30 U.S.C. § 1428 (1982); Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Mining,
supra note 28.
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ject, nature and administration of some of the mining regulations.
Resolution of those difficulties does not appear imminent. However
difficult and important these issues may be, they nevertheless do not
entail rejection of either the universal use principle or the agreed regu-
lation principle by either side.
C. The Reasonable Regard Principle
If everyone has the right to use an area for the same or different
purposes, it is clear that the right to use must be conditioned by a duty
to respect others' right to use the same area.
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas provides that high
seas freedoms "shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard
to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas." Needless to say, if one regards deep seabed mining as a
freedom of the high seas, this principle protects mining activities from
interference and at the same time limits mining activities that may
interfere with other uses, including other mining activities.
Article 87 of the 1982 Convention repeats this principle, expressly
including deep seabed mining:
These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,
and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with re-
spect to activities in the Area.
With particular regard to deep seabed mining, article 147 provides:
1. Activities in the Area shall be carried out with reasonable regard for
other activities in the marine environment.
3. Other activities in the marine environment shall be conducted with
reasonable regard for activities in the Area.38
Once again, the dispute over high seas status is of no relevance.
The reasonable regard or due regard principle applies under either
view.
D. The Peaceful Purposes Principle
Article 88 of the 1982 Convention states, "The high seas shall be
reserved for peaceful purposes." Article 141 declares that the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction is open to use "exclusively for peaceful
purposes."
The author has expressed his views on the meaning of this princi-
38. The alternative use of the terms "reasonable regard" and "due regard" is of no conse-
quence. See Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 827 n.52 (1984).
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ple elsewhere, and will not repeat them here.3 9 The main point is that
this principle also involves no dispute between advocates and oppo-
nents of the high seas status position.
E. Marine Scientific Research
Article 87 of the 1982 Convention expressly identifies scientific re-
search as one of the freedoms of the high seas, subject to the provisions
of Part XIII of the Convention dealing with marine scientific research
in more detail. Article 240, which applies to all areas, provides, "All
States, irrespective of their geographical location, and competent inter-
national organizations have the right to conduct marine scientific re-
search subject to the rights and duties of other States as provided for
in this Convention."
With reference to the seabeds beyond national jurisdiction, Article
143 provides, "States Parties may carry out marine scientific research
in the Area," and Article 256 provides, "All States, irrespective of
their geographical location, and competent international organizations
have the right, in conformity with the provisions of Part XI, to con-
duct marine scientific research in the Area." 4
Article 143 is the only provision that specifically enumerates re-
quirements for marine scientific research on the seabed beyond na-
tional jurisdiction. Its first and third paragraphs essentially
summarize and cross-reference the requirements applicable to all
marine scientific research under Part XIII. Its second paragraph deals
with research conducted by the Seabed Authority itself.
Once again, assuming general acceptance of the provisions of the
Convention apart from Part XI, it is clear that the debate over high
seas status is irrelevant to the issue of the right to conduct marine
scientific research.
F. The Common Heritage Principle
The Declaration of Principles adopted by the U.N. General As-
sembly states, "The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of
mankind." Article 136 of the 1982 Convention declares, "The Area
and its resources are the common heritage of mankind." No similar
39. Id. at 829-32.
40. The Convention text is not consistent in its use of the terms "States" and "States Par-
ties." In the particular context of marine scientific research, the difference in terminology would
not appear to have any significance. The argument that scientific research on the seabed is lim-
ited to parties would be contradicted by Articles 87, 238 and 256 in any event.
Michigan Journal of International Law
provision appears in the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea or
elsewhere in the 1982 Convention.
The debate over the deep seabeds is sometimes presented as a con-
flict between "high seas" and "common heritage." It should be clear
from all the materials previously analyzed that this is misleading. The
common heritage principle, as incorporated into Part XI of the 1982
Convention, exists alongside a significant number of other principles
elaborated in Part XI that have their origin in high seas law.
It is argued that the common heritage principle requires more elab-
orate institutional and substantive restraints on the "universal use"
principle than have been customary on the high seas. Be that as it
may, the very idea of negotiated restraints on the exercise of high seas
freedoms is not alien to high seas law and tradition; quite to the con-
trary, it is an integral part of the system. One simply cannot imagine
multiple and potentially conflicting uses of the high seas without
agreement on ground rules. It is difficult to imagine the absence of
organizations such as IMO and ICAO devoted to the continual elabo-
ration and administration of such ground rules with respect to particu-
lar uses. Protection of the marine environment in an area open to use
by all requires agreement on environmental restraints by all users, and
mechanisms for enforcing and updating those restraints.
In truth, there is nothing in the common heritage principle that is
inconsistent with high seas law. States may accept any substantive or
institutional restraints on their high seas freedoms that they believe
suitable. Were Part XI "generally accepted," there would even be
some basis in high seas law for arguing that at least some of the rele-
vant regulations must be respected by all.41 Certainly in spirit, high
seas law is far closer to the idea of a common heritage of mankind
than to appropriation by coastal or other states.
The key question is whether the restraints of Part XI that are not
generally accepted may be imposed on non-parties. The argument
that they may not be so imposed is not peculiar to high seas law, but
rather derives from international law more generally. That argument
is wholly independent of positions regarding the common heritage
principle, and indeed may even be supported by the principle. There is
ample support in municipal law for the premise that those with co-
equal rights in a thing cannot be deprived of those rights without
consent. 42
41. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, at art. 10; U.N. Convention, supra note
5, arts. 94, 213-19.
42. The question of whether they may be compelled by a court to accept a monetary
equivalent of those rights is presumably not relevant to this inquiry.
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V. CONCLUSION
As of today, the basic structure of the international law applicable
to the seabed beyond coastal state jurisdiction is agreed. National
claims are prohibited. The area is open to use by all. Any use of the
area must be conducted with reasonable regard for other uses of the
marine environment, and other uses of the marine environment must
be conducted with reasonable regard for any use of the area. All uses
of the area must be conducted in accordance with the duty to protect
and preserve the marine environment.
The significance of this level of agreement, given the alternatives,
should not be obscured by debates over whether the agreed principles
derive from high seas law as a legal matter, or purely as a historical
matter. Broadside attacks on high seas law or on Part XI of the Con-
vention do little more than place in jeopardy those basic principles
that are agreed. Such attacks are far too sweeping to explain with any
accuracy what is not agreed.
The area of disagreement concerns the nature and administration
of restraints on the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources.
Even in this respect, the area of disagreement is far narrower than it
seems. For example, by tying the spatial and temporal criteria for ex-
clusive rights to a mine site to use,43 Part XI of the 1982 Convention is
much closer to pure Lockean theories of property than its ideological
opponents seem prepared to admit.
It is natural that those favoring the restraints on mining set forth
in Part XI argue that the exercise of a right of access to deep seabed
resources is conditioned on compliance with those restraints, while
those opposing the restraints argue that the right of access is independ-
ent of compliance with conditions that have not been agreed. It is
implausible to assume that this kind of debate can be resolved in the
abstract by invoking, or rejecting, the application of high seas law as a
whole.
More specifically, even with respect to the points of disagreement,
the debate over high seas status is irrelevant. In the words of Article 2
of the High Seas Convention, "freedom of the high seas is exercised
under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules
of international law." The real question is not whether there is a uni-
versal right to mine, but whether "the other rules of international law"
now include the restraints of Part XI. That is a question to be an-
swered by the principles applicable to the emergence of new norms of
43. See U.N. Convention, supra note 5, ann. III, art. 17, para. 2.
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international law, not by principles specific to the law of the sea or the
seabed.
Those who support a universal duty to respect the restrictions on
mining set forth in Part XI must demonstrate that those restrictions
are now part of international law. For this purpose, it is essentially
irrelevant whether they maintain that there was no prior international
law on the matter, or that the prior high seas right to mine was subject
to the emergence of subsequent specific regulation, or that the prior
high seas right has now been conditioned by the emergence of specific
regulation. But a great deal is lost by making the first argument and
completely rejecting the applicability of high seas law. That argument
is worse than unnecessary and descriptively inaccurate: from the per-
spective of those who reject the restraints of Part XI, it implies that
the Lotus case gives them a completely free hand. That is no good for
anyone.
At the same time, those who maintain that the specific restrictions
on seabed mining set forth in Part XI apply only to the parties to the
Convention must counter the contention that those restrictions are
now part of international law. For this purpose, it is essentially irrele-
vant whether they maintain that the principles and rules set forth in
the Convention bind only its parties or maintain that some of the de-
tailed restraints and institutional arrangements in Part XI of the Con-
vention have not been accepted by states with significant interests in
the matter. But a great deal is lost by making the first argument and
completely rejecting the general acceptability of the Convention as a
whole, or even Part XI as a whole. That argument too is worse than
unnecessary and descriptively inaccurate: from the perspective of
those who reject the high seas argument, it implies that the principles
of the Convention as a whole, including the unobjectionable principles
embodied in Part XI, are not relevant to relations with non-parties.
That too is no good for anyone.
From the perspective of a seabed miner, it is perhaps a bit disin-
genuous to say that the legal principles applicable to the seabed be-
yond coastal state jurisdiction are now generally agreed, except for the
problem of regulating deep seabed mining. But from the perspective
of all the interests of all the states in the world, that is no mean
achievement. Mining is not yet imminent. The rhetoric used in the
debate regarding the matters that remain to be agreed should not
cloud or, worse still, prejudice the principles that are agreed.
Pas trop de zelel
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